Inclosure 5 (Aviation Support) to After Action Report 13-66 (U)


1. General:


a. Army Aviation support for Project "Delta" was provided by the 281st Aviation Company (-).

Equipment and personnel totaled six (6) UH-1D and four (4) UH-1D helicopters, fifteen

officers and thirty nine enlisted men.


b. Mission and accomplishments are as follows:

(1) Total flying hours 360:55

(2) Tasks flown 128

(3) Sorties flown 182

(4) Passengers flown 573

(5) Cargo Flown 41.3 tons

(6) Medical evacuations 4

(7) Aircraft hit by enemy fire 3

(8) Three (3) Ranger Operations (VN). In each operation, the Aviation Company was

augmented by a Marine Detachment of two (2) CH-46 helicopters. In each of these

operations, the Marines lifted the bulk of the troops while the 281st Aviation

Company provided the Command and Control Aircraft, recovery aircraft and weapon

support aircraft.


c. During the operation, Camp Khe Sanh was given airlift support by the Aviation Company.

A total of 123 personnel were infiltrated in the vicinity of coordinates KD9425 and

KD8925. This operation was a "Search and Destroy" type mission and was started on 6

November 1966. During the following two days, a total of 51 Viet Cong suspects were

extracted from the area of operations. CH-34's assisted in this operation.


d. A total of six (6) reconnaissance teams and seven (7) Road Runner teams were

successfully placed in the area of operation and each was successfully extracted. There

were no emergency extractions during this operation.


e. Normal administration and maintenance flights were flown during the lax periods of the



f. As a result of the crash of an Air Force O-1E, the 281st Aviation Company provided the

aircraft for the extraction of the crash victims. As a result of this action, two (2) officers

and two (2) enlisted men are being submitted for the Air Medal with the "V" device.


2. Problem Areas:


a. Insufficient area was provided for the security of the aircraft adjacent to the TOC and

billeting area. This was mainly caused by terrain limitations, but a smoother operation

could be obtained by having these areas adjacent to each other.


b. Upon arrival in the area of operation, the aircraft were separated from the [illegible]

([illegible] Dong Ha). This caused coordination problems and [illegible] for the teams in

the field. This was not a permanent problem, however, but initially it was a definite



c. Inadequate coordination was made between the Aviation Company and Detachment B-52,

prior to the operation. This resulted in an insufficient number of tents available for

aviation personnel, lack of coordination for the procurement of PX items, normal

resupply from Nha Trang. Recommendations are listed in Paragraph 3, below.


3. Conclusion:


a. That an "on-site" reconnaissance be performed by the B-52 Commander and the 2nd

Platoon Leader, 281st Aviation Company. Total equipment and site requirements can be

determined at that time.


b. If at all possible, the aircraft parking area be adjacent to the TOC and billeting area and

inside the normal security perimeter. Also, in no instance should the TOC and aviation

operation be at different locations.


c. That adequate aviation coverage was provided throughout the problem. Weather did not

significantly hamper the aviation support.





s/Philip R. Waldman


Captain, Infantry

Asst S-3