ANNEX C (Aviation Support) to After Action Report to OPORD 5-66, HQ, Det B-52, 5th

SFG, 1st SF, 1 May 66.


1. GENERAL: This annex will deal with the aviation support provided Project Delta in the areas

of helilift, forward air control, and air radio relay.


2. HELILIFT SUPPORT: For team infiltrations and exfiltrations was provided by 2nd Plat (-),

171st Aviation Company, Nha Trang.


a. Size and Composition

(1) 6 HU-1B slicks and 3 HU-1B guns.

(2) 17 officers and 25 enlisted personnel.

(3) Maintenance support provided by UMO-6, UH-1E squadron Chu Lai.


b. Mission: Provide airlift support to Det B-52 during the period 14-30 April to include

implementation of team infiltrations and exfiltrations, tactical air reconnaissance, admin

and logistical flights, and other missions as directed.


c. Enemy Situations:


(1) With the exception of the team 4 extraction, minimum ground fire was received.

Upon extraction of team 4, 10 automatic weapons directed fire at the escort gun

ships. One 50 caliber machine gun fired approximately 40 rounds. The gun ships

provided continuous support of the extraction of team 4 firing a total of 28 HE

rockets and 4000 - 5000 rounds of 7.62mm. Enemy weapons were silenced after gun

ships struck area. Possible 3 bunkers destroyed with occupants.


(2) During extraction of team 9, gun ships struck north side of hill adjoining LZ with a

possible 2 VC killed.


(3) During extraction of team 7, gun ships struck hill 300 meters south of LZ with no

estimate of enemy casualties.


d. Terrain and Weather: Covered in intelligence annex (Annex B).


e. Problems and Recommendations:


(1) PROBLEM: To support infiltration of 3 teams on a given day 6 slicks and 3 guns do

not allow for unexpected maintenance problems.

RECOMMENDATION: That a minimum of 7 slicks and 3 guns be committed to

support any operations which programs infiltration of 3 teams on a given day.


(2) PROBLEM: The rope ladder and McGuire rig are not satisfactory for emergency


RECOMMENDATION: That this unit be issued and install the winch system for

UH-1B (Bell kit 205-706-030-1).


(3) PROBLEM: The UH-1B has 01 + 30 hours of fuel with 30 minutes of reserve;

thereby allowing only a limited amount of target coverage. In the extreme portion of

this TAOR, the gun ships could remain on target for only 20 minutes.

RECOMMENDATION: That this unit be issued HU-1D for troop carrying and HU-1B

(540 system) for gun ships, both allowing 03 + 15 fuel capacity.


(4) PROBLEM: The slope landing characteristics of the HU-1B is hampered by low

rotor-to-ground relationship.

RECOMMENDATION: That all recon teams be advised of this relationship.


(5) PROBLEM: The C and C ship was not always informed as to the enemy situation

and type LZ prior to initiating a team extraction.

RECOMMENDATION: That team leader always provide these facts when

requesting exfiltration.


(6) PROBLEM: Panels are extremely hard to spot from high altitude.

RECOMMENDATION: That at least two team members have mirrors and

concentrate them on C & C ship and ship immediately following.


(7) PROBLEM: When only one recovery ship is in formation, the C & C must act as

recovery #2.

RECOMMENDATION: That no more than 2 passengers be taken on tactical flights

on C & C ship.


f. REMARKS: Support provided by 36 MAG, 1st Mar Div was outstanding in all aspects.

Their personnel extended every effort to assist 2nd Plat, 171st Aviation in the

accomplishment of its mission.




s/Floyd J Walters


Captain, Infantry